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Felberbaum: Rights of Transgender Students

BOYS WILL BE GIRLS, AND GIRLS WILL BE BOYS:
URGING THE SUPREME COURT TO RECOGNIZE A
TRANSGENDER STUDENT’S RIGHT TO USE THE
APPROPRIATE FACILITIES IN A FEDERALLY FUNDED
SCHOOL
Dianna Felberbaum *
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Americans have increasingly become more
aware about gender identity and how gender has evolved to mean more
than just the biological assignment an individual was given at birth. 1
This is due to the fact that not only are individuals becoming more
comfortable questioning their gender identity due to increased
acceptance of transgender individuals in society, but also because
individuals are questioning their gender identities at a younger age. 2
As a result, schools throughout the nation have “increasingly . . .
adopted policies protecting transgender students from discrimination,
providing that transgender students be allowed to use restrooms and
locker rooms and participate in sports in accordance with their gender
identity.” 3 However, there is vast inconsistency with how the nation’s
*J.D.

Candidate 2018, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; TOURO LAW REVIEW,
Associate Editor; B.A. in English, Stony Brook University. I would like to thank Professor
Rena Seplowitz and Megan Forbes for their guidance and support.
1 Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression as Protected Speech in the
Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE. 89, 102-03 (2015) (defining
“gender” as “that gender classification with which an individual identifies-an individual’s own
sense of being male or female or something in between ‘whether or not that gender-related
identity . . . is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s physiology or
assigned sex at birth,’” defining “gender expression” as referring “to an individual’s ‘external
characteristics and behaviors that are socially defined as either masculine or feminine, such as
dress, mannerisms, speech patterns and social interactions,’” and defining a “transgender” as
“an umbrella term encompassing the state of one’s gender identity or expression being
inconsistent with that individual’s assigned sex at birth.”).
2 Id. at 99.
3 Id. at 113.
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federally funded school systems handle the presence of transgender
students. 4 The lack of uniformity of laws protecting transgender
students is due to a split in the Circuit Courts of the United States. 5 As
a result, “schools are blindly navigating an unplowed terrain.” 6 The
most effective way to create uniformity in the absence of congressional
action for these students is with definitive guidance from the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The nation’s public education system and its transgender
students were supposed to receive this desperately needed guidance in
October 2017, when the Supreme Court was scheduled to hear G.G. v.
Gloucester County School Board. 7 In fact, the matter proved to be so
urgent that the Court moved the hearing to the end of March 2017. 8
However, on February 22, 2017, President Donald Trump withdrew
special guidance that would protect transgender students in federally
funded schools. 9 As a result, the Supreme Court reversed its decision
to hear the case, and in one sentence, sent the case back down to the
Fourth Circuit. 10 The Court explained that the first issue 11 before it
concerned the guidance document given by former President Barack
4

Id. at 112-14.
See generally G.G. ex rel. Grimm. v. Gloucester County School Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th
Cir. 2016); Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College Dist., 325 Fed. App’x. 492 (9th
Cir. 2009).
6 Weatherby, supra note 1, at 104.
7 Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017); see also Moriah Balingit &
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Takes Up School Bathroom Rules for Transgender Students,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
16,
2016),
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-takes-up-schoolbathroom-rules-for-transgender-students/2016/10/28/0eece4ea-917f-11e6-a6a3d50061aa9fae_story.html?utm_term=.f56d225e16c9.
8 Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., SCOTUS BLOG (last visited Apr. 7. 2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/gloucester-county-school-board-v-g-g/.
9 Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk for the
Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file with author),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/16-273-2.22.17-DOJ-Cover-LetterGuidance.pdf.
10 G.G., 137 S. Ct. at 1239 (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of the guidance
document issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22,
2017.”); see also SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 8.
11 Brief for Respondent at i, Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., 2017 WL 766063
(2017) (No. 16-273) (listing the first question presented as “[w]hether the Gloucester County
School Board’s policy, which prohibits school administrators from allowing boys and girls
who are transgender to use the restrooms that other boys and girls use, constitutes
“discrimination” “on the basis of sex” under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C § 1681(a)?”) [hereinafter “Brief for Respondent”].
5
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Obama which current President Donald Trump subsequently
withdrew, and the second issue 12 regarded the school’s policy which
was unrelated to former President Obama’s guidance. 13 As a result,
the Fourth Circuit was required to “take a closer look” at the school’s
policy without any additional guidance from the Supreme Court.14
However, it was argued that the Fourth Circuit could affirm “the
judgment on any ground supported by the record” 15 because despite
the guidance’s withdrawal, “the meaning of Title IX and 34 C.F.R §
106.33 will remain the same.” 16 What is most troubling is that both
Gavin—the plaintiff in this case—and the school board agreed that the
Supreme Court should hear the case. 17
This note will argue that the Fourth Circuit should affirm its
previous ruling, allowing the parties to appeal to the Supreme Court,
which should hold that federally funded schools are required to allow
transgender students to use the restroom associated with their gender
identity. Part I of this note will provide an overview of the individual
rights at issue in this circuit split. These individual rights are
established by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title VII, Title IX, 34
C.F.R. § 106.33 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Part II will identify and discuss
the circuit split that exists on this issue between the Fourth Circuit, in
G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, and the Ninth Circuit, in
Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District. Part III will
provide an overview of Petitioner Gloucester County School Board’s
petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, as well as
identify the questions the Supreme Court should have addressed in
G.G. and should address in the future. Part IV will highlight key
Supreme Court cases that demonstrate that if the Supreme Court were
12

Id. (listing the second question presented as “[w]hether the Department of Education’s
conclusion that 34 C.F.R § 106.33 does not authorize schools to exclude boys and girls who
are transgender from the restrooms that other boys and girls use - as set forth in an opinion
letter, statement of interest, and amicus brief - is entitled to deference under Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997)?”).
13 Amy Rowe, Justices Send Transgender Bathroom Case Back to Lower Courts, No Action
(Mar.
6,
2017),
on
Same-sex
Marriage
Cake
Case,
SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/justices-send-transgender-bathroom-case-back-lowercourts/.
14 Id.
15 Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 26 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166
(1997)).
16 Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 26.
17 Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 26.
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to hold that federally funded schools are required to allow transgender
students to use the restroom associated with their gender identity,
based upon giving deference to the Department of Education’s
interpretation of what constitutes discrimination under Title IX, this
ruling would be consistent with existing precedent. Part V will discuss
key lower court cases that would support a Supreme Court decision to
hold that federally funded schools are required to allow transgender
students to use the restroom associated with their gender identity.
Finally, Part VI will provide a conclusion along with recommendations
for both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in how they should
hold in this case as well as future cases involving the rights of
transgender students in the public-school system.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, TITLE VII, TITLE IX, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33,
AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The liberty interests afforded to transgender students, which
give them the right to use the bathroom associated with their gender
identity in public schools, are rooted in several different areas of the
law that work together to protect these individuals from impermissible
discrimination. First, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution states that:
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 18
Second, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based
on “race, color, religion, sex or national origin,” 19 which complements
Title IX’s prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of sex.” 20 In
addition, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 allows for comparable facilities for
“separate toilet, locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of

18
19
20

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991).
20 U.S.C § 1681(a) (1986).
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sex,” as long as the facilities are “comparable” for both sexes. 21 In
order to allege a Title IX violation, a plaintiff must show “1) that the
plaintiff was excluded from participation in an education program
based on sex; 2) that the educational institution was receiving federal
financial assistance at the time of exclusion; and 3) that the improper
discrimination caused the plaintiff harm.” 22 Lastly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
states:
Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected . . . any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. 23
When determining the scope of rights afforded to transgender
students in the public- school system, it will be critical for the courts
to turn to the above-mentioned provisions in order to ensure that these
students are being treated equally among their peers. Furthermore, as
discussed below, the courts should also seek guidance from the
Department of Education’s interpretation of these regulations in
evaluating school policies that discriminate against transgender
students.
II.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

The Fourth Circuit

In G.G., Gavin, a transgender male high school student, who
was biologically born a female, argued that his public school,
Gloucester County School, wrongfully discriminated against him in
“violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title IX.” 24 G.G argued that the school wrongfully
discriminated against him by banning him from using the men’s
restrooms. 25

21
22
23
24
25

34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2000).
G.G., 822 F.3d at 718.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
G.G., 822 F.3d at 715-16.
Id. at 714.
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The United States Department of Education (hereinafter
“DOE”) enforces Title IX to allow for “separate toilet, locker room,
and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided
for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities for
students of the other sex.” 26 The Gloucester County School Board
(hereinafter “Gloucester Board”) wrote a letter to the DOE asking for
advice on how to handle this matter. 27 The DOE responded and
interpreted how Title IX should apply to transgender individuals.28
The letter stated, “when a school elects to separate or treat students
differently on the basis of sex . . . a school generally must treat
transgender students consistent with their gender identity.” 29
At the beginning of his sophomore year, Gavin’s mother
informed the school that Gavin was transgender. 30 The school was
supportive and made sure that all staff treated Gavin as a male. 31 At
first, the school permitted Gavin to use the male restroom. 32 Gavin
used the male restroom without any issues for approximately seven
weeks until community members, including parents of students who
attend the school, contacted the school and objected to his use of the
men’s restroom. 33 Members of the community argued at school
district meetings that Gavin should not be allowed to use the men’s
restroom. 34 They argued that Gavin’s use of the men’s restroom
violated other students’ privacy, his use would lead to sexual assault
in restrooms, and would cause non-transgender males to come to
school wearing dresses in order to gain access to the women’s
restroom. 35 One community member said that Gavin “has no right, or
she has no right to use a bathroom where the men are exposed. That
makes them uncomfortable. It makes me uncomfortable.” 36 Another
community member said that bathrooms “are divided by sex not
gender, not some made up term that some organization wants you to

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 715; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2000).
G.G., 822 F.3d at 715.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
G.G., 822 F.3d at 715.
Id. at 715-16.
Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7.
Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7.
Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7.
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believe as the truth.” 37 Additionally, a different member of the
community said, “[w]e do not want a policy of biological boys and
biological girls in the same facility where an expectation of privacy
exists.”38
In response to the school district meetings, Gavin was
interviewed and said:
It was humiliating to have a publically facilitated
discussion about a minor’s genitals and bathroom
usage. It was very dehumanizing. It was almost as if I
was another topic on a budget list or some sort of
zoning management claim. It was as if there wasn’t a
real person that was suffering in this case. What they
did was send a message that this student is different. I
am the only student in that High School required to use
a separate alternate facility whereas my peers are free
to use the restrooms in align with their gender identities.
To go back to school after a public discussion has been
had about your genitals explicitly and bathroom usage,
it feels like you’re in one of those nightmares where you
go to school without underwear except for it actually
was really happening. It was humiliating. It felt like I
had been stripped of all agency, privacy, all humanity
that I had. Transgender people are real people with real
needs. It is time for us to have a platform. 39
After the community members’ objections, the school
suspended Gavin’s use of the men’s restroom. 40 In response to his
suspension, Gavin argued that he could not use the women’s restroom
because he would physically appear as a male in the women’s
restroom. 41 As a result, the women in the women’s restroom would
see Gavin as a man in the women’s restroom, and “react negatively,”
for example, by yelling at him and telling him to leave because men
are not allowed in the women’s restroom. 42 He further argued that
using the women’s restroom would cause him severe psychological
37
38
39
40
41
42

Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7.
Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7.
Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7.
G.G., 822 F.3d at 716.
Id.
Id.
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distress and would be inconsistent with his treatment for gender
dysphoria. 43 In response to Gavin’s objections, the school provided an
alternative, gender-neutral restroom for him to use; however, he also
objected to the use of this restroom. 44 He explained that the genderneutral restroom would make him feel even more stigmatized because
“it sets him apart from his peers and served as a daily reminder that the
school views him as ‘different.’” 45
The Fourth Circuit held in favor of Gavin, stating that the
DOE’s letter interpreting its Title IX regulation permitting schools to
provide sex-segregated bathrooms, in which the Department instructed
that schools must treat transgender students consistent with their
gender identity if they provided sex-segregated bathrooms, was
entitled to Auer deference. 46 The Auer deference doctrine established
by the Supreme Court states, “when an agency interprets its own
regulation it is entitled to near-absolute deference,” unless its
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” 47 The Auer deference is not applicable when it appears
that the interpretation is no more than a convenient litigating position
or when the interpretation is a post-hoc rationalization. 48
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the DOE’s interpretation of
its regulation, Title IX, is consistent with prior interpretation because
although the DOE’s interpretation is “novel,” as the Supreme Court
previously explained, “novelty alone is no reason to refuse

43 Id.; Weatherby, supra note 1, at 110 (defining gender dysphoria as “simply the diagnosis
that attaches to individuals manifesting the “clinically significant distress” associated with the
conflict over their gender identity.”).
44 G.G., 822 F.3d at 716-17.
45 Id.; Weatherby, supra note 1, at 122 (“[A]n individual’s conduct in using a restroom
designated as either ‘male’ or ‘female’ expresses that individual’s belief that she belongs in
that designated category of persons. By choosing to enter a facility labeled for a specific
gender group, that individual is effectively stating her association with that gender. Although
no words may ever be uttered, there is a strong mental association between the designation
affixed to a restroom door and the fact that only those individuals identifying with that
designation would enter and use that facility. Therefore, since a transgender student’s
selection of a particular restroom is ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,’
the conduct is expressive and sends a particularized message about the student’s gender
identity.”) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
46 G.G., 822 F.3d at 723.
47 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1324 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–463 (1997)); see also Nicholas R. Bednar, Defying
Auer Deference: Skidmore as a Solution to Conservative Concerns in Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Association, MINN. L. REV. VOL 100 (2015).
48 G.G., 822 F.3d at 722.
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deference.” 49 The court continued to explain that the interpretation is
a legitimate position because the DOE “has consistently enforced this
position since 2014.” 50 Moreover, it reasoned that the DOE’s
interpretation is not a post-hoc rationalization because “it is in line with
the existing guidance and regulations of a number of federal agencies,
all of which provide that transgender individuals should be permitted
access to the restroom that corresponds with their gender identities.”51
B.

The Ninth Circuit

In Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District,52
Rebecca Kastl, a transgender female college student, who was
biologically born a male, argued that Maricopa County Community
College wrongfully discriminated against her in violation of Title VII,
Title IX and her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.53
Rebecca argued that she was wrongfully discriminated against when
the community college denied her access to the women’s restroom. 54
The school banned her from using the women’s restroom until she
could prove that she had completed a “sex reassignment surgery.” 55
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school, and Rebecca appealed this judgment. 56 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision that Rebecca was properly
banned from using the women’s restroom. 57 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that Rebecca stated a “prima facie case of gender
discrimination under Title IV based on the theory that impermissible
gender stereotypes were a motivating factor” in the school’s decision
to ban her from the women’s restroom. 58 However, the Ninth Circuit
found that Rebecca’s claims of gender discrimination failed. 59 The
court reasoned that the establishment of a prima facie case is not

49

Id.
Id.
51 Id.
52 325 F. App’x 493 (9th Cir. 2009).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College Dist., 2006 WL 2460636, at *8 (D. Ariz.
2006).
57 Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 494.
58 Id. at 493.
59 Id. at 493-94.
50
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sufficient to overcome a summary judgment motion. 60 The court
found that the school provided sufficient evidence that Rebecca was
banned from using the women’s restroom for safety reasons. 61
Ultimately, the court concluded that Rebecca failed to provide
sufficient evidence to prove that the school was motivated by her
gender to ban her from the restroom. 62
III.

GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD’S PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN G.G. EX REL.

The Gloucester Board argued that the Supreme Court should
grant its petition for three reasons:
First, this case provides an excellent vehicle to
reconsider, refine or abolish the Auer doctrine. Second,
if the Supreme Court decides to retain Auer in some
form, this case provides an excellent way to resolve
important disagreements among the lower courts about
Auer’s proper application. Third, this case provides an
excellent example to determine whether the
Department of Education’s understanding of Title IX
reflected in the ‘Ferg-Cadima’ 63 and ‘Dear
Colleague’ 64 letters must be given effect, thereby
resolving once and for all the current nationwide
controversy generated by these directives. 65
Shortly after the Gloucester Board’s decision to ban Gavin
from using the men’s restroom, Emily T. Prince, one of Gloucester
Board’s attorneys, wrote to the DOE asking for “guidance or rules”
relevant to this decision. 66 On January 7, 2015, James A. FergCadima, an Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the
Department’s Office of Civil Rights, responded and stated that “Title

60

Id. at 494.
Id. at 493-94.
62 Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 494.
63 See generally Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima to the Gloucester School Board at 121a
(May 13, 2016) (on file with author).
64 See generally Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon and Vanita Gupta to the Gloucester
School Board, 126a (May 13, 2016) (on file with author).
65 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Gloucester County School Bd., 2016 WL 4610979
(2016) (No. 16-273).
66 Id. at 8.
61
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IX… prohibits recipients of Federal financial assistance from
discriminating on the basis of sex, including gender identity,” and
further that “Title IX regulations permit schools to provide sexsegregated restrooms, locker rooms, shower facilities, housing, athletic
teams, and single-sex classes under certain circumstances.” 67 As a
result, Ferg-Cadima concluded that “when a school elects to separate
or treat students differently on the basis of sex in those situations, a
school generally must treat transgender students consistent with their
gender identity.” 68 Shortly after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in G.G.
gave the Ferg-Cadima letter Auer deference, the DOE, as well as the
Department of Justice, wrote a “Dear Colleague” letter seeking to
impose that same requirement on every Title IX-covered educational
institution in the nation. 69
On October 28, 2016, the Supreme Court granted a Writ of
Certiorari to the Gloucester Board in G.G. 70 The Supreme Court
limited the questions it would address to the following two issues:
(1) [w]hether courts should extend deference to an
unpublished agency letter that, among other things,
does not carry the force of law and was adopted in the
context of the very dispute in which deference is
sought; and (2) whether, with or without deference to
the agency, the Department of Education’s specific
interpretation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 . . .
should be given effect. 71
On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “for
further consideration in light of the guidance document issued by the
Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22,
2017.” 72

67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon and Vanita Gupta, supra note 64.
SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 8.
SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 8.
SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 8.
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IF THE SUPREME COURT WERE TO RULE THAT FEDERALLY
FUNDED SCHOOLS ARE REQUIRED TO ALLOW
TRANSGENDER STUDENTS TO USE THE RESTROOM
ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR GENDER IDENTITY, THE RULING
WOULD BE COSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT
A.

Review of Supreme Court Cases

The argument that the Court should give deference to the
Department of Education’s interpretation of Title IX, which gives
transgender students the right to use the facilities that associates with
their gender identity, is consistent with existing precedent where the
Court has also given deference to an agency’s interpretation of their
own regulations. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 73 the Supreme
Court held that sex discrimination that violates Title VII includes
differential treatment positioned on “sex based” considerations which
include gender. 74 In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was denied a
position as a partner at an accounting firm because, in the opinion of
the partners of the accounting firm, she did not meet the standards of
how a woman should be portrayed. 75 The Court reasoned that this
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII because
Hopkins was subjected to differential treatment solely because of
considerations based on her gender and because she “failed to act like
a woman.” 76
In Auer v. Robbins, 77 the Supreme Court held that the Secretary
of Labor’s interpretation of its own regulation was entitled to
deference. 78 In that case, police sergeants sued their employer, the St.
Louis Police Department. 79 The sergeants argued that they were
entitled to overtime payment under § 7(a)(1) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (hereinafter “FLSA”). 80 Section 213(a)(1) of
the FLSA exempts “bona fide executive, administrative, or
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 241-42.
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 258.
519 U.S. 452 (1997).
Id. at 453.
Id. at 455.
Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2010).
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professional” employees from overtime pay requirements. 81 In
response, the St. Louis Police Department argued that the sergeants
were not entitled to the overtime pay because they fell under this
exemption as “bona fide executive, administrative or professional
employees.” 82 Under the FLSA, one of the requirements needed to
qualify under the exemption is that the employee must earn a specified
minimum amount of money on a “salary basis.” 83 According to the
FLSA, an employee is paid under a salary basis if “under his
employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a
weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all
or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction
because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work
performed.” 84
The sergeants argued “that the ‘salary basis’ test was not met
in their case because under the terms of the St. Louis Metropolitan
Police Department Manual, their compensation could be reduced for a
variety of disciplinary infractions related to the ‘quality or quantity’ of
the work that they performed.” 85 However, the Secretary of Labor
interpreted the “salary basis” test and determined that the test is
satisfied when an employee’s compensation may not, “as a practical
matter,” be adjusted in ways inconsistent with the test. 86 Furthermore,
the Secretary of Labor determined that the “salary basis” test is
violated if there is either an actual practice of making deductions, or
an employment policy that creates a “significant likelihood” of
deductions. 87 The Supreme Court explained that since the words
“subject to,” the regulation’s critical phrase, “comfortably bears the
meaning the Secretary assigns,” the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation
of its own test was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation,” and was therefore controlling. 88
In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 89 the Supreme
Court held that the unequal treatment of a public high school’s girls’
81

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2014).
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 455 (1997).
83 Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (2014); 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(e) (2014); 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(e)
(2014).
84 Auer, 519 U.S. at 455.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 461.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
82
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basketball team in comparison with the boys’ basketball team was a
violation of the girls’ rights under Title IX. 90 In that case, Roderick
Jackson was the coach of the girls’ sports teams at Ensley Public High
School. 91 He discovered that the girls’ teams were not receiving equal
funding or equipment in comparison with the boys’ sporting teams.92
As a result, Roderick confronted the school and argued that the unequal
treatment was not only unfair, but that it kept him from adequately
doing his job. 93 The school did not respond to his complaints. 94
Roderick was subsequently fired for not adequately doing his job. 95
Roderick sued the school and argued the school discriminated against
him in violation of Title IX when he was fired in retaliation for
complaining about sex discrimination. 96
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that
retaliation constituted discrimination in Roderick’s case, and therefore
the school violated Title IX. 97 The Court found that in previous Title
IX violation cases, Title IX “broadly” prohibits a funding recipient
from subjecting any person to “discrimination . . . on the basis of
sex.” 98 Retaliation against a person who has complained about sex
discrimination is a form of intentional sex discrimination that is
protected by Title IX. 99 Retaliation is an intentional act which is a form
of “discrimination” because the complainant is being subjected to
The Supreme Court reasoned that
differential treatment. 100
discrimination is a term that covers a wide range of intentional unequal
treatment 101 and that Congress intended to give the statute a long reach
by using such a broad term as discrimination. 102
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 103 the Supreme Court held that an agency has the authority to

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 171-72.
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171-72.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 173.
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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interpret its own statute. 104 In 1977, Congress encouraged states to
meet the Environmental Protection Agency’s (hereinafter “EPA”)
standards through the Clean Air Act Amendments (hereinafter “CAA
Amendments”). 105 The CAA Amendments require states to enact
programs that regulate “new or modified major stationary sources of
air pollution.” 106 The CAA Amendments allow a state to adopt a
definition of the phrase “stationary source.” 107 That definition is then
controlling in determining when “an existing plant that contains
several pollution emitting devices may install or modify one piece of
equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will
not increase the total emissions from the plant.” 108
The Supreme Court held that the program agencies were
entitled to deference in interpreting the meaning of the “stationary
source.” 109 The Court reasoned that when a court analyzes an agency’s
interpretation of its own statute there are two questions the Court must
ask. 110 The first question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue.” 111 Accordingly, “if the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.” 112 Yet, if “the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute . . . .” 113 The Court
continued to state that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the [second] question for the court to ask is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.” 114
In Chevron, the Court acknowledged that the statute was silent
on the specific issue and, therefore, the Court must ask whether the
EPA’s definition of “stationary source” is based on a reasonable

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 866.
Id. at 839-40.
Id. at 840.
Id.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
Id. at 866.
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
Id.
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interpretation of the statute. 115 The Court found that the EPA’s
definition of “stationary source” was based on a reasonable
interpretation of the statute because the statute “seeks to accommodate
progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth.” 116 The
Court explained that:
the language may reasonably be interpreted to impose
the requirement on any discrete, but integrated,
operation which pollutes. This gives meaning to all of
the terms; a single building, not part of a larger
operation, would be covered if it emits more than onehundred tons of pollution, as would any facility,
structure, or installation. 117
The EPA interpreted the phrase “stationary source” to mean “any
building, structure, facility, or installation” that emits air pollution.118
Furthermore, the Court explained that it has:
long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of
a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the
principle of deference to administrative interpretations.
It has been consistently followed by this Court
whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a
statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies,
and a full understanding of the force of the statutory
policy in the given situation has depended upon more
than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters
subjected to agency regulations. 119
B.

Analysis of Supreme Court Cases

If the Supreme Court were to hold that federally funded schools
are required to allow transgender students to use the restroom
associated with their gender identities, it would be consistent with the

115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 843-44.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 861.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 861-62.
Id. at 844.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/15

16

Felberbaum: Rights of Transgender Students

2017

RIGHTS OF TRANSGENDER STUDENTS

1059

Court’s prior rulings in Price Waterhouse, 120 Auer, 121 Jackson, 122 and
Chevron. 123 The Court expressly established in Price Waterhouse that
differential treatment based on sex, like the differential treatment
Gavin is being subjected to, is sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII. 124 As the Court ruled in Auer and Chevron, and as the Fourth
Circuit has already held, it is appropriate for an agency to be afforded
deference to interpret the meaning of its own regulations. 125 Although
former President Obama’s guidance was withdrawn by President
Trump, “the meaning of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 [] remain[s]
the same.” 126
In Gavin’s case, the DOE was asked to interpret its own
regulation, Title IX, in relation to the use of restrooms by transgender
students in Gloucester County Public School. 127 The DOE interpreted
Title IX and determined that “when a school elects to separate or treat
students differently on the basis of sex . . . a school generally must treat
transgender students consistent with their gender identity.” 128 This
Court previously reasoned in Auer that an agency’s interpretation of
its own regulation is not plainly erroneous when a statute’s critical
phrases “comfortably bear the meaning to which it is assigned.” 129 In
Gavin’s case, Title IX “comfortably bears the meaning to which” the
DOE assigns. 130 Title IX’s critical phrase prohibiting “discrimination
on the basis of sex” establishes that a public school may not
discriminate against a student on the basis of sex. 131 As the Supreme
Court ruled in Jackson, 132 an individual is discriminated against when
they are subjected to “differential treatment.” 133 When a public high
school requires only one student out of the entire school population to
120

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
519 U.S. 452 (1997).
122 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
123 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
124 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
125 See generally Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Auer
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 455 (1997); G.G. ex rel. Grimm. v. Gloucester County School Bd.,
822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
126 Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, supra note 9.
127 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715.
128 Id.
129 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
130 Id.
131 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1986).
132 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74.
133 Id. at 172.
121
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use a separate alternate restroom facility, while all other students and
staff members are free to use the restrooms aligned with their gender
identity, this is a clear example of differential treatment. 134 As the
Court has already established, discrimination of an individual through
differential treatment is a violation of Title IX. 135 Accordingly, Title
IX comfortably bears the meaning to which the DOE assigns because
the DOE’s interpretation is that “a school must treat transgender
students consistent with their gender identity” and, thus, may not
discriminate against transgender students by subjecting them to
differential treatment. 136
Additionally, according to the Court’s previous reasoning in
Chevron, in analyzing an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation,
the appropriate question to ask is whether the agency’s definition is
based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 137 A reasonable
interpretation of Title IX is that discriminating and subjecting someone
to differential treatment on the basis of sex is prohibited. 138
V.

IF THE SUPREME COURT RULES THAT FEDERALLY FUNDED
SCHOOLS ARE REQUIRED TO ALLOW TRANSGENDER
STUDENTS TO USE THE RESTROOM ASSOCIATED WITH
THEIR GENDER IDENTITY, THE RULING WOULD BE
CONSISTENT WITH LOWER COURT PRECEDENT
A.

Review of Lower Court Cases

In Schwenk v. Hartford, 139 the Ninth Circuit held that sex
discrimination includes any “differential treatment based on a
consideration ‘related to the sex of’ the individual.” 140 In this case,
Crystal Schwenk was a transgender individual who was biologically
born a male. 141 She was diagnosed with gender dysphoria at a young
age. 142 Although Schwenk had not undergone sex reassignment

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 173-74.
Id.
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173.
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
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surgery, she identified as a woman, both physically and mentally. 143
While incarcerated, a prison guard was told that Schwenk was a
transgender. 144 Once the prison guard was informed of this
information, the guard began treating her differently than nontransgender inmates. 145
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Price Waterhouse and concluded that under Title VII, sex included
both biological sex and gender. 146 As a result, the court reasoned the
terms “sex” and “gender” are “interchangeable.” 147 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit found that the prison guard’s actions were “at least in
part” motivated by Schwenk’s gender 148 because the prison guard
began to treat her differently from non-transgender inmates only upon
learning that she was transgender. 149 As a result, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the actions constituted differential treatment as defined
by the Supreme Court, which violated Title VII and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 150
In Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 151 the Sixth Circuit held that a
transgender’s Title VII rights were violated when the individual was
subjected to gender discrimination. 152 In this case, plaintiff Jimmie L.
Smith was biologically born a male but identified as a female. 153 Smith
was diagnosed with gender dysphoria 154 and began to undergo a sex
change by changing her physical appearance to become more
feminine. 155 Her co-workers noticed these changes. 156 As a result, her
co-workers held a meeting and determined that Smith needed to
undergo multiple psychological evaluations because she was a

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.
Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193.
Id. at 1193-94.
Id. at 1202.
Id.
Id.
Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
Id.
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
Smith, 378 F.3d at 569.
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transgender. 157 However, none of the non-transgender employees had
to undergo such evaluation. 158
The Sixth Circuit held that forcing Smith to undergo
psychological evaluations because she was a transgender constituted
unconstitutional gender discrimination because, as the Supreme Court
established in Price, sex discrimination includes differential treatment
based on sex. 159 The Sixth Circuit explained that “sex stereotyping
based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible
discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such
as ‘trans[gender],’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the
victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender nonconformity.” 160 As a result, the Sixth Circuit determined that
“discrimination against a plaintiff who is trans[gender]—and therefore
fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from
the discrimination directed against [the plaintiff] in Price
Waterhouse,” which the Supreme Court determined was
unconstitutional.” 161
In Carcaño v. McCrory Berger, 162 the District Court for the
District of Maryland held that students of a federally funded school
were “likely to succeed on the merits of their Title IX claim that the
law violated Title IX by discriminating against them on the basis of
sex.” 163 In this case, transgender students sued their federally funded
public school. 164 The students argued that a state law mandating that
restrooms and changing facilities could only be used by individuals
based on their biological sex discriminated against transgender
individuals in violation of Title IX as well as the Equal Protection and
Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 165 The students’
first argument was that the state law violated Title IX because the law
subjected them to unconstitutional differential treatment. 166 The state
law required public entities to ensure that restrooms and other similar

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id.
Id.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 575.
Smith, 378 F.3d at 575.
203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Id. at 615; 632-33.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
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facilities were used by individuals based on their biological sex. 167 The
North Carolina law defined biological sex as the sex listed on an
individual’s birth certificate. 168
The District Court reasoned that the students were excluded
from a federally funded educational program because of their sex.169
The court found that this violated Title IX because it provides:
‘[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance’ . . . . As a result, institutions may not ‘limit
any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege,
advantage, or opportunity’ on the basis of sex. 170
Under Title IX, “access to bathrooms, showers, and other similar
facilities qualifies as a ‘right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity.’” 171
The school’s enforcement of the North Carolina law caused the
students medical harm, among other injuries. 172
In analyzing the students’ second claim that they were
discriminated against, the court stated that to evaluate a Title IX claim,
the court must undertake a two-part analysis. First, the
court must determine whether the North Carolina law
violates Title IX’s general prohibition against sex
discrimination. Second, if the North Carolina law does
violate Title IX’s general prohibition against sex
discrimination, the court must then determine whether
an exception to that general prohibition applies. 173
In analyzing the first part of the test, the court observed that the
Supreme Court established in Jackson that, “Title IX is a broadly
written general prohibition on discrimination, followed by specific,
narrow exceptions to that broad prohibition.” 174
The court
acknowledged that one of the DOE regulations that permits schools to
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 621.
Id.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 650.
Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 635.
Id.
Id. at 635-36.
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“provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis
of sex,” is a potential exception. 175 However, the court looked to G.G.,
which stated that “the court must give controlling weight to the DOE
opinion letter, which states that schools ‘generally must treat
transgender students consistent with their gender identity,’ when
considering the scope of this exception during the second stage of the
analysis.” 176 As a result, the court found that the North Carolina law
requires that schools allow students to use restrooms and similar
facilities on the basis of sex.177 Because the provision of sexsegregated facilities requires schools to treat individuals differently
depending on their sex, the North Carolina law fell within Title IX’s
general prohibition against sex discrimination.178
In analyzing the second part of the test, the only potentially
applicable exception is regulation § 106.33, 179 which allows for sexsegregated bathrooms and similar facilities. 180 However, the court
looked to G.G. and the DOE opinion letter which stated that a school
must treat students consistent with their gender identity. 181 In contrast,
the North Carolina law required “schools to treat students consistent
with their birth certificates, regardless of gender identity.” 182 The court
reasoned that although the North Carolina law “is consistent with the
DOE opinion letter when applied to most students, it is inconsistent
with the DOE opinion letter as applied to the individual transgender
Plaintiffs, whose birth certificates do not align with their gender
identities.” 183 Consequently, the court determined that the North
Carolina school’s actions do not fall within the exception. 184
In Schroer v. Billington,185 the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that a transgender job applicant was discriminated
against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 186 In that case, the
plaintiff, Diane Schroer, was a transgender female who was born a
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 636.
Id.
Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 636.
Id. at 636.
34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2000).
Carcaño, F. Supp. 3d at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
Id. at 308.
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male. 187 Diane applied for a job as a “[s]pecialist in Terrorism and
International Crime” with the Congressional Research Service at the
Library of Congress. 188 However, she applied for the job prior to
holding herself out as a woman. 189 Thus, she applied for the job as
“David J. Schroer,” the name she was legally given at birth.190
Nevertheless, Diane was well qualified for the job and as a result was
offered the position. 191 However, when Diane informed the employer
that she was a transgender and planned to undergo sex reassignment
surgery prior to starting her employment, the employer rescinded her
offer of employment. 192 The employer claimed that her transition
would “divert” her “full attention away from the mission” at the
library. 193
The court found that the employer’s decision to rescind Diane
employment offer was based on sex stereotyping. 194
The court
reasoned that under Title VII, it does not matter “whether the Library
withdrew its offer of employment because it perceived Schroer to be
an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or
an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual.” 195 The court
compared Diane’s case to an employee being fired “because she
converts from Christianity to Judaism.” 196 It explained that this
example would be a “clear case of discrimination ‘because of
religion.’” 197 Accordingly:
Discrimination “because of religion” easily
encompasses discrimination because of a change of
religion. But in cases where the plaintiff has changed
her sex, and faces discrimination because of the
decision to stop presenting as a man and to start
appearing as a woman, courts have traditionally carved
such persons out of the statute by concluding that
“transsexuality” is unprotected by Title VII. In other
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
Id.
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id. at 305-06.
Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
Id. at 306.
Id.
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words, courts have allowed their focus on the label
“transsexual” to blind them to the statutory language
itself. 198
B.

Analysis of Lower Court Cases

As established in Schwenk and Smith, subjecting a transgender
individual to differential treatment solely because he or she is
transgender constitutes sex discrimination as defined by the Supreme
Court in violation of Title VII. 199 Just as Crystal in Schwenk was
treated differently by the prison guard solely because she was
transgender, and as Jimmie in Smith was treated differently by the
employer solely because he was a transgender, here, Gavin is being
treated differently by the school because he is not allowed to use the
restroom associated with his gender identity, as all the other students
are, solely because he is a transgender. 200 Like Gavin who has not
undergone sex reassignment surgery, both Crystal Schwenk and
Jimmie Smith had not undergone sex reassignment surgery when they
were subjected to such differential treatment. 201 Nevertheless, like
Gavin, both Crystal Schwenk and Jimmie Smith were otherwise fully
identifiable as the gender with which they sought to be identified.202
Both courts recognized that the differential treatment that Crystal
Schwenk and Jimmie Smith were subjected to constituted
unconstitutional sex discrimination as established by the Supreme
Court. 203
As demonstrated in Carcaño, prohibiting transgender
individuals from using facilities consistent with the gender they
identify with “causes significant and irreparable physical,
psychological, economic, social, and stigmatic harm to transgender
people including the more than 44,000 transgender adults residing in
North Carolina . . . .” 204 The privacy and safety interests that North
198

Id. at 306-07.
Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202; Smith, 378 F.3d at 572.
200 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202; G.G., 822 F.3d at 716; Smith, 378 F.3d at 575.
201 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202; G.G., 822 F.3d at 716; Smith, 378
F.3d at 575.
202 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193; Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
203 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202; Smith, 378 F.3d at 575.
204 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff United States’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief at 1, Carcaño v. McCrory Berger, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D. 2016) (No.
1:16-cv-425).
199
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Carolina claimed as a defense “in enacting and implementing” the state
law “are factually baseless and legally insufficient to justify the
discrimination.” 205 This is because the “more than 44,000 transgender
individuals” in North Carolina have been using facilities “consistent
with their gender identity” for a long time without causing any privacy
or safety issues. 206
As the court reasoned in Schroer, “whether viewed as
discrimination based on the divergence between [Gavin’s] gender
identity and ‘biological’ sex or discrimination due to gender transition,
a policy that allows for differential treatment solely based on an
individual’s gender or sex ‘literally discriminates because of . . .
sex.’” 207 Just as it would clearly be unconstitutional to allow for
differential treatment of an individual who converted to another
religion, the court must not turn a “blind eye” to the differential
treatment to which Gavin is subjected. 208
VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Fourth Circuit should affirm its previous ruling, allowing
the parties to appeal to the Supreme Court, which should hold that
federally funded schools are required to allow transgender students to
use the restroom associated with their gender identity. First, the Fourth
Circuit court should look to the parties who agree that it is urgent for
the Supreme Court to hear and decide this case. 209 Second, the
Supreme Court should examine societal values, as reflected in the
policies underlying Titles VII and IX when making its determination.
Society seeks to protect transgender persons. 210 Since President
Trump’s withdrawal of guidance to federally-funded schools that
allowed students to use restrooms associated with their gender identity,
countless organizations, experts, and celebrities have all put forth great
efforts to support the transgender community and their determination

205

Id.
Id. at 15.
207 Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
208 Id. at 306-07.
209 Rowe, supra note 13.
210 On March 2, 2017, Yelp joined 52 other companies in signing onto an amicus brief
supporting Gavin Grimm. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Yelp is Making it Easier to Find GenderNeutral Restrooms, CNN, (Mar. 3, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/technology/yelptransgender-bathroom-rights/.
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to seek justice. 211 On March 30, 2017, North Carolina repealed its state
law, as discussed in Carcaño, which required individuals to use
bathrooms associated with the gender on their birth certificate. 212 The
Court must focus on what really matters in this case: the well-being of
the nation’s most vulnerable communities, like its youth. There has
been no claim that the students in Gavin’s school feel threatened by his
use of the men’s restroom. Gavin stated himself that he had “nothing
to fear” from his peers. 213 It is only the parents who have made Gavin’s
use of the men’s restroom an issue; however, they are not the ones
using the school bathrooms, but it is their children who are using them.
Society not only seeks to protect order, but also to avoid abuse of the
system. 214 Finally, since the students do not have a problem with
Gavin’s use of the men’s restroom, neither should their parents and,
therefore, neither should a court.

211

Id.
Governor Roy Cooper signed the new bill, repealing the old bill and stated: “For over a
year now, House Bill 2 has been a dark cloud hanging over our great state. It has stained our
reputation. It has discriminated against our people and it has caused great economic harm in
many of our communities.” Jason Hanna, Madison Park & Eliott C. McLaughlin, North
Carolina
repeals
“Bathroom
Bill,”
CNN,
(Mar.
30,
2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/index.html.
The
economic harm the Governor referred to refers to the fact that since North Carolina passed the
prior bathroom law that is now repealed, business and organizations have deserted the state in
order to express their disagreement with the law. Id. Since that law has been repealed, the
Governor expressed that these businesses and organizations plan to come back to the state. Id.
213 Balingit & Barnes, supra note 7.
214 In 2016 a man in Seattle entered a Women’s locker room and claimed that “the law has
changed and I have a right to be here.” Alison Morrow, Man in Women’s Locker Room Cites
Gender Rule, KING, (Feb 16, 2016), http://www.king5.com/news/local/seattle/man-inwomens-locker-room-cites-gender-rule/65533111. Witnesses claimed that the man made no
physical or verbal attempt to identify as a woman. Id. A woman who uses this locker room
frequently said this event was “a first” and that it was “bizarre” and questioned “why would
anyone want to do that?” Id. The women said “either identify yourself as a transgender or
you’re not and you’re just taking advantage of a loophole.” Id. This event, although disturbing
and “bizarre,” pointed out a pertinent matter that the law that addresses this issue must be clear
as to not allow for individuals like this man to take advantage of the system. Id. Currently,
“there is no specific protocol as to how someone should perform gender in order to access a
bathroom. Morrow, supra note 214. They just rely on verbal identification or physical
appearance.” In this case, the Seattle man performed neither. Morrow, supra note 214.
212
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